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STUDIES IN GERSONIDES

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IT is an occasion for wonder and admiration that at this stage and under these conditions of the world's history, when the material, practical and immediate hold the attention of thinkers, authors and publishers alike, there existed a scholar who was willing to give his time to translate a mediaeval and scholastic work, such as is the *Milhamot ha-Shem* of Gersonides, into a modern language, and that a publisher should have been found who had the courage to give this to the scholarly world. And yet this most improbable thing has happened. Benzion Kellermann has undertaken this difficult piece of work, and the first part of his translation has been published by the Berlin Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums.¹ This first part contains only the first section of Gersonides's treatise, constituting about one-fifth of the work as it appears in the published editions of the original. For be it noted that the published editions of the original Hebrew are not complete, leaving out as they do the first part of the fifth section, a lengthy composition devoted to astronomical questions.

Dr. Kellermann is a disciple of Hermann Cohen, the famous Neo-Kantian philosopher, recently of the University of Marburg, and the founder of the so-called Marburg school. Kellermann shows a deep interest in philosophical problems and a wide reading in philosophy, mediaeval and modern. He believes that a historical work is valuable only in so far as the historian relates

¹ *Die Kämpfe Gottes von Lewi ben Gerson*, Uebersetzung und Erklärung des handschriftlich revidierten Textes von Benzion Kellermann. Erster Teil. Berlin, Mayer und Müller, 1914, 8°, pp. xvi + 309 (Schriften der Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums, Band III, Heft 1-3).

the period of which he treats to the development of thought that preceded and led up to it, as well as to the ideas that grew out of it, leading up to the current philosophy of the day. Moreover, he is of the opinion that a philosophical method of treating a historical subject in the domain of philosophy should itself spring out of the historian's own philosophical point of view. Not merely the validity of the thought under discussion but the exposition thereof, too, should be viewed from a definite philosophical standpoint as a basis. True, such a method lends itself to the charge of being subjective, but it is better frankly and deliberately to embrace subjectivity than to claim its opposite, which cannot be realized, for pure objectivity does not exist. And Kellermann goes as far as to claim this free privilege not only for the historian but for the translator as well. Accordingly he inserts now and then in his translation a phrase or expression harking forward to Cohen and Neo-Kantianism, and in his notes, some of them very long, and especially in his excursuses at the end of the book, he discusses Gersonides's doctrines *sub specie aeternitatis*, so to speak or, to be more exact, *sub specie Hermannii Cohen*.

It is not my intention here to argue this debatable question, particularly since a translation as such cannot be much affected by notes and excursuses. Provided the text is rendered correctly, the careful reader who is familiar with the subject has the wherewithal to make himself independent of the translator's notes. In this particular instance the translator deserves our special commendation for having been brave enough to rush in where many a student would have feared to tread, not so much by reason of the difficulty of the undertaking as because of the feeling of isolation that overtakes one when he finds that the great majority even of students of philosophy are busy with other things and scarcely lend an ear to one's lucubrations. Another service that Kellermann has done, which will be appreciated even by those who can read the original, is that he consulted several manuscripts, which enabled him in a number of passages to correct the printed readings and to supply omissions which made the printed text unintelligible.

As to the main point, the translation itself, our judgement cannot be an unqualified approval. There are a great many errors, some more serious, some less so. I have marked no less than 311 passages where the rendering of words or phrases or sentences seem to me incorrect or misleading. These errors seem to be due to various causes. Sometimes the translator mistakes one meaning of an ordinary word for another. Sometimes he misses the exact meaning of a technical term or does not know that it is a technical term. Or he fails to see the sequence of an argument and connects the sentences incorrectly. In some cases, too, the error arises from the fact that the text is corrupt in the manuscripts as well as in the printed editions, and the emendation obviously required by the context did not suggest itself to Kellermann. Considering that it will be a long time before another modern translation will be undertaken of the *Milhamot*, it seemed proper to take up the passages rendered, as it appears to me, incorrectly by Kellermann, and set them right. The emended passages in the text will also be of value to the future editor of the original Hebrew.

The following references to the Hebrew text are to the page and line of the Leipzig edition (L.):

1. (L. 2, 31)

וראוי שלא יעלם ממנו שלא יעמוד בזאת השאלה מופת מעניינים קרובים לעולם, כאלו תאמר הסבה הראשונה, כי היתה ידיעתנו בעצם הסבה הראשונה חלושה מאד, ולזה אי אפשר שנעשה ממנה התחלת מופת בזאת החקירה, אמנם המופתים שאפשר העשותם בזאת השאלה הם מסוג מופתי הראיה בהכרח, ר"ל שהם לקוחים מעניינים מתאחרים לזאת הראיה.

(K. 3, 2)

Es darf uns jedoch nicht verborgen bleiben, dass uns in diesem Problem kein Beweis *über*² das Vorweltliche zur Verfügung steht

² Italics mine.

I take it for granted that Kellermann had the same text as in the Leipzig edition, since he does not indicate a variant. And yet he renders the particle מ in מענינים קדומים 'über' instead of 'von', thus destroying the entire sense of the author. Gersonides does not say that in this problem (viz. the origin of the world) there is no proof *for* premundane things, as for example the First Cause, but, as the sequel shows, that in the arguments concerning the origin of the world we cannot make inferences *from* things that are prior to the world, say the first cause. He is discussing a matter of applied logic or methodology. The best kind of syllogistic proof in logic is what is known as מופת הסבה והמציאות יחד, i. e. a syllogism in which the middle term is by nature prior to the last term and the cause of it. Such a proof is known as an absolute demonstration מופת מוחלט. An example would be the following: All men are mortal, *A* is a man, therefore *A* is mortal. The middle term, 'man', is prior to 'mortal' and the cause of it.

Now take the following example: All wetness is the result of a liquid, this spot is wet, therefore there was a liquid here. The middle term here is 'wetness', which is not the cause of the last term, 'liquid', but the consequence thereof. We proved an event in this case by inferring the cause from the consequence. A proof of this kind is regarded as inferior and is known as מופת המציאות, and more properly as ראיה (Ar. دلالة, Greek σημειον). Averroes in his compendium of logic, Hebrew translation, Riva, 1560, defines these two kinds of proof respectively as follows:

מופת הסבה והמציאות: . . . יתחייב בהכרח בזה המין מן ההיקש עם היותו מועיל לחכמות האמתיות שיתן עם זה הסבה, עד שיהיה הגבול האמצעי בו סבה לשני דברים ר"ל הידיעה בדבר וסבת הדבר, בחלוף מה שהוא עליו הענין במופת המציאות כי הגבול האמצעי שם אמנם סבה לידיעתו בתולדה לבד לא לתולדה . . .³

The meaning is that in a real demonstration the middle term is not only the cause of our inferring the conclusion, but is in reality the cause of it, whereas in the so-called ראיה the middle

term is in reality the result of the conclusion, though it is the cause of our knowing it. Further on Averroes characterizes the מופת המציאות as follows:

ואולם מופת המציאות . . . הגבול האמצעי לא יהיה בו סבה לתולדה אבל אמנם יהיה סבה לידיעתנו לבד ולא יהיה הקודמת בו בידיעה קודמת במציאות ואשר בזה התאר שני מינים, אחד מהם והוא הראשון מה שנאמר עליו ראיה הוא המין אשר יתבאר בו תמיד הקודם במציאות במתאחר בו כאשר היה קודם בידיעה דמיון זה שנבאר שהירה כדורי התמונה בעבור שאורו יצמח בתמונה הירחית.⁴

To come back to Gersonides, he tells us that we cannot prove the origin of the world by means of a real demonstration, i.e. by arguing from a thing prior to the thing we want to prove, as for example from the First Cause, because our knowledge of the First Cause is very imperfect. We are limited to the inferior proof known as ראיה, which argues from the consequent to the antecedent.

Averroes makes the same remark in his compendium of the *Metaphysics*⁵ regarding the proofs employed in that science:

واما انواع البراهين المستعملة فيه ايضاً فهي أكثر ذلك دلائل اذ كنا انما نشير فيه ابدأ من الامور التي هي اعرف عندنا الى الامور التي هي اعرف عند الطبيعة *

Or, as the Hebrew translation of Moses Tibbon has it:⁶

ואולם מיני המופת הנעשים בו גם כן הם רובם ראיות כי הנה נקח בו ראיה תמיד מן הענינים אשר הם יותר ידועים אל הענינים אשר הם יותר ידועים אל הטבע.

2. (L. 3, 24)

והנה במקומות מה הארכנו בביאור מה שיחשוב המעיין שהתבאר בדברי זולתנו, והביאנו לזה דבר מה חדשנו בו . . .

(K. 4, 16)

Doch manche Stelle haben wir deshalb in unserer Erörterung

⁴ *Ibid.*, 40 b.

⁵ Ed. Caird, pp. 5, 8.

⁶ MS. copy in my possession.

breiter behandelt, weil der Leser vermuten könnte, dass es sich dabei um die Erörterung fremder Ansichten handelt . . .

Here Kellermann misses the point. Gersonides says that although he has endeavoured in general to be brief, nevertheless in some cases he discusses a subject at length, though it may seem to the reader that the subject has been sufficiently treated by others, because he has something new to say on the subject.

3. (L. 4, 7)

רבים ייחסו לנו לעזות מצח ולהריסה חקרנו בקדמות העולם וחידושו.

Kellermann (5, 19) translates הריסה by 'Zerstörungssucht', from הרס, to destroy. The correct meaning is in this case rashness, presumption, and it is related to the phrase in Exodus (19. 21) ה' פָּן יִהְיֶה אֵלָיִךָ. The term was first used by Samuel Ibn Tibbon, at the suggestion of Maimonides himself, to render the Arabic תהאפת (6th conj. of הפת), which means to fall over one another, to rush headlong into danger. See Munk, *Guide*, I, p. 23, note 1.

4. (L. 4, 20)

ואולם היה אפשר שיאמרו כי זאת החקירה לא יפול בה האמת כי אם לנביא, כי הם אולי יאמרו שמה שיוֹדע לנביא בדרך הנבואה אי אפשר ידיעתו לחכם מדרך העיון. עוד ישנו אבל זה המבוקש התבאר לנביא בדרך הנבואה ויחויב מזה המנע ידיעתו לחכם מדרך העיון.

(K. 6, 3)

Indes könnten sie sagen, dass bei einer derartigen Forschung nur einem Propheten sich die Wahrheit erschliessen kann ; denn sie könnten vielleicht sagen : Was sich einem Propheten auf dem Wege der Prophetie erschloss, das kann unmöglich einem Gelehrten auf spekulativem Wege offenbar werden : *Ferner gibt es einige, die sagen:*⁷ Würde dies Problem einem Propheten auf dem Wege der Prophetie erschlossen werden, so *würde* sich gerade die Unmöglichkeit des Erschliessens für einen Gelehrten auf spekulativem Wege ergeben.

⁷ Italics mine.

Kellermann confuses the passage, which is very simple and clear. For he makes Gersonides give the same identical argument twice and present it as two distinct arguments. And the mistake is due simply to a misunderstanding of the overlined words עור יִשְׁנו. K. read them evidently עור יִשְׁנו, and not knowing what to make of them rendered them 'Ferner gibt es einige die sagen', and the mischief was done. The following words had to be a new argument, and so he was obliged to render התבאר and ויחויב as conditional, despite the אבל at the beginning.

As a matter of fact the words which troubled Kellermann should be read עור יִשְׁנו = Then they say again. We have here an argument of this form:

If a is b , then b is c ;

But a is b , therefore b is c .

In this particular case the argument is as follows: These people may argue, says G., 'That which the prophet acquires through prophetic revelation, the philosopher cannot know by means of speculation'. (This is the first part of the conditional syllogism.) Then they continue (עור יִשְׁנו), 'But the question at issue (viz. the creation of the world) *was* revealed to the prophet. Therefore it follows that it cannot be acquired by the philosopher by means of speculation'. It is one argument and not two.

5. (L. 5, 18)

ומה שגור הרב רבינו משה נ"ע בהמנע ההשגה בזה המבוקש אינה טענה עליו, אם לא נתבאר בטול מה שנתחייב ממנו אחר מחלקי הסותר בואת החקירה כמו שקדם.

(K. 7, fin.)

Was aber die Entscheidung des Maimonides betrifft: Die Perzeption dieses Problemes sei unmöglich, — so ist dies kein Einwand gegen uns, es müsste denn sein, dass sich eine bestimmte Absurdität erweisen liesse, insofern sich hieraus einander kontradizierende Teile in dieser Forschung ergeben, wie vorausgeschickt wurde.

This translation is quite impossible, and Gersonides meant to say something entirely different. As the expression כמו שקדם indicates, he is referring to the following passage on p. 4, 17.

ועוד שדברינו בזאת החקירה אם היו צודקים יהיה מה שיחשבו בו גנות שבת, רוצה לומר אם השגנו מה שנעלם מן הקודמים ואם לא היו צודקים, הוא מבואר שמהצר ההוא לבר ישיגנו הגנות.

He is trying to defend himself here against those conservatives who are opposed to every new undertaking, assuming that what the ancients have not succeeded in proving, the moderns surely cannot, and hence they accuse every new thinker of presumption. Gersonides answers these critics as follows: You must not condemn my attempt in advance. See the result first. If I succeed in proving my point, i.e. in solving the problem of the origin of the world, which has not hitherto been solved, I shall deserve commendation instead of condemnation. And if my solution is a failure, I shall deserve condemnation to be sure, not for attempting to solve, but for failing to do so.

Now in the passage under discussion he refers to Maimonides' well-known statement in the *Guide of the Perplexed* that the question of the eternity or creation of the world is one that cannot be scientifically proven. This judgement of the matter, Gersonides then says, need not be regarded as condemning my undertaking in advance, unless you can invalidate my disjunctive (אחד מחלקי הסותר) mentioned before. In other words, G. means, either I succeed or I fail. If I succeed I deserve praise and not blame for solving what the great Maimonides thought insoluble. If I fail you can blame me for failing but not for making the attempt. In advance you must not judge me.

6. (L. 6, 7)

וכן הוא מבואר שאין ראוי למעיין בדברינו שירדפנו תחת אהבתנו אותו וכוונתנו להועיל, למעון על דברינו בסבות (לאהבת) הנצוח. כי זה, אולי יהיה סבה שלא יבין מדברינו מה שרצינו בהם.

(K. 9, 6)

Ebenso ist erwiesen, dass der Leser unseres Buches uns nicht dafür, dass wir ihn lieben und ihm nützen wollen, verfolgen darf, *indem er unseren Worten streitsüchtige Motive unterschiebt. Dies möchte vielleicht darin begründet sein,*⁸ dass er gar nicht versteht, was wir damit beabsichtigen.

This translation is inaccurate. What Gersonides says is that the *reader* must not approach the book with a disputatious attitude (למען על דברינו לאהבת הנצוח), because the prejudice arising therefrom may prevent him from understanding the meaning of the author.

7. L. 7, 12)

ובקצת אלו הדרושים הישירנו למצא האמת הישרה נפלאה מה שבא מזה בתורה.

(K. 11, 5)

Bei einigen Untersuchungen leitet sie (sc. die Spekulation) uns dazu an, die richtige und hervorragende Wahrheit dessen zu finden, was hiervon in der Thora vorkommt.

This is the very opposite of what Gersonides intended to say. His words above quoted must be construed as follows: **מה שבא מזה בתורה הישירנו הישרה נפלאה למצא האמת**. That is, the teaching of the Bible often guided Gersonides in a remarkable way in seeing the truth in philosophical problems. The sequel confirms this.

וראוי היה להיות כן לפי שהתורה תכוון להניע המתנהגים בה אל השלמות האנושית בתכלית מה שאפשר ובהיות הענין כן והיו בבאן דרושים עמוקים מאד יקשה לאדם ההנעה אליהם, הנה מן הראוי היה שתישיר אותנו התורה להניע אל אמתתם.

8. (L. 7, 28)

האחת, כי יש שם עניינים קודמת ידיעת קצתם בטבע לקצת, כקרימת ידיעת ההקדמות לידיעת התולדה המהוייבת מהם, וזה אם בחכמה אחת ואם בשתי חכמות, כמו שהעניינים הלמודיים תקדם ידיעתם בטבע

⁸ Italics mine.

לעניינים הטבעיים, ואם הנושא האחר יותר כולל מן האחר, וזה כי הלמודי יחקור בגשם מוחלט, והטבעי יחקור גם כן בגשם מוחלט, אלא שהוא יחקור בו מצד שהוא מתנועע.

(K. II, fin.)

Erstens: Es gibt Gegenstände, bei welchen von Natur aus die Kenntnis des einen der Kenntnis der anderen vorangehen muss, wie die Kenntnis der Prämissen der Kenntnis des aus ihnen gefolgerten Schlusses, und dies ist bald bei einer, bald bei zwei Wissenschaften der Fall. So muss die Kenntnis mathematischer Dinge von Natur aus der Kenntnis physikalischer Dinge vorangehen, *obgleich der eine Träger (sc. der Wissenschaft) mehr enthält als der andere*;⁹ so untersucht die mathematische Wissenschaft den absoluten Körper und ebenso die physikalische, nur untersucht diese ihn in bezug auf seine *Bewegung* . . .

The italicized passage is difficult and should have had a note. The meaning is apparently that mathematics is prior by nature to physics, even though the subject of the former is more comprehensive (יותר כולל) than that of the latter. For mathematics deals with body in the abstract, whereas physics has for its subject body as affected by motion. Body as such is more comprehensive or more universal because it embraces all bodies without exception, or because it abstracts from any of the qualities of body. Now the concessive form of the clause would indicate that one would ordinarily expect the more universal subject to come later by nature than the more particular, but this is clearly opposed to the opinion of Aristotle, who says time and again that whereas for us individual men (ἡμῶν) the particular (τὸ καθ' ἕκαστα) is better known than (γνωριμώτερον), and hence prior to (πρότερον) the universal (τὸ καθόλου), by nature (φύσει), or absolutely (ἀπλῶς), the universal is prior. The clearest passage is the one in the *Posterior Analytics*, i, ch. 2, p. 71 b 33, ed. Bekker: *πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς· οὐ γὰρ τὰντὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῶν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ*

⁹ Italics mine.

πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

Accordingly we should expect G. to say that mathematics is prior by nature to physics *because* (not *although*) the subject of mathematics is more universal than that of physics. It seemed therefore at first that the clause *וְאִם הַנוּשָׂא הָאֶחָד יוֹתֵר כּוֹלֵל מִן הָאֶחָד* should be translated, 'and also when the one subject is more universal than the other', as a second condition of priority by nature in addition to the priority of the premises to the conclusion mentioned before. In this case we should expect this clause to come before the illustration of mathematics and physics. It is not in fact impossible that it was misplaced by some copyist, who found it in the margin of his copy and did not know where it belonged. For there is another objection to construing the clause concessively, and that is that we then desiderate a reason why mathematics is by nature prior to physics.

There is, however, a way of defending the concessive interpretation as follows. There is a passage in the *Physics* which has given the commentators of Aristotle a good deal of trouble because it seems to contradict the relation between the universal and particular expressed above. The passage reads as follows (*Phys.* i. 1, p. 184 a 16): *πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφὴ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προῖέναι. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστιν· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρος τὸ καθόλου.*

This seems to say in the underlined part that we should begin with the universal because that is better known to us, though not better known by nature, a direct contradiction of the authentic views of Aristotle elsewhere, as shown before. The commentators

solve this difficulty by pointing out that *καθόλου* and *καθ' ἑκαστα* are used here in a different sense from the ordinary, which reverses their meaning. *καθόλου* is equivalent to *συγκεχυμένον* and *ὅλον*, namely, a sensible whole of which *καθ' ἑκαστα* are the conceptual parts (see Waitz, *Organon*, II, p. 306 ad 71 b 21; Trendelenburg, *De Anima*, p. 338; Zeller, *Philos. d. Griechen*, II, 2, 3rd ed., p. 197, note 2). But it would seem as if Averroes did not understand it this way, for in his compendium of the *Physics* (Heb. translation, ed. Riva di Trento, 1560, p. 3 a) we find the following :

ואולם סדר הלמוד הנעשה בה הנה בעבור שאמנם נתחיל מן הענינים אשר הם אצלנו יותר ידועים בין שיהיו הם הידועים אצל הטבע או לא יהיו והיו ההתחלות הכוללות יותר ידועות אצלנו בבקשה והיה אפשר שנעמד עליהם במהירות מצד הכללות המגיע אותם והיה הכולל תמיד אצלנו יותר ידוע מן המיוחד כי ההרגשים אשר יתחדשו מתחלת הענין והדמיונים בלתי נפרדים ולא נכרים ואין הענין אצל הטבע כן כי הידועים אצל הטבע הם המיוחדים אשר מהם יעשו הרברים כענין באומנות המעשיות היה מן המחוייב שנתחיל בעיין בהתחלות הכוללות לעניינים הטבעיים . . .

This passage says plainly that by nature the particular is better known than the universal. Gersonides did not read Aristotle. He read Averroes, and the passage just quoted probably influenced him, so that he might have said that mathematics comes before physics, even though, as the more universal subject, it is by nature less known. But the difficulty still remains—why *is* mathematics prior by nature to physics? I do think the suggestion I made above may be the correct one. This is confirmed by G. himself in the following paragraph (L., p. 8 init.) where he tells us that universals come before particulars, הקדמת הענינים הכוללים לעניינים המיוחדים.

9. (L. 7, fin.)

וזה המין מן הקדימה מחוייב מצד הענין והמעין.

(K. 12, 12)

Diese Art des Vorsetzens *ergibt sich*¹⁰ von seiten des Gegenstandes und des Lesers.

¹⁰ Italics mine.

'Ergibt sich' is not a correct translation of מחוייב in this place. Gersonides is speaking of the proper order of investigation and exposition. He says there are seven conditions determining correct order. Some of these conditions make a given order absolutely necessary (על צד החיוב, מחוייב), some merely make it preferable (על צד היותר טוב). Each of these may again be subdivided. A given order may be essential (מחוייב) for the subject-matter (מצד הענין), or for the reader or investigator (מצד המעיין), or for both at once (מצד הענין ומצד המעיין). Similarly a given order may be merely preferable (על צד היותר טוב) in the same three ways. In the sequel he gives an example first of the order of priority which is *essential for subject-matter and reader* (מחוייב מצד הענין והמעיין). K., by rendering מחוייב by 'ergibt sich', destroys the meaning.

10. (L. 8, 1 ff.)

והשנית הקדמת העניינים הכוללים לעניינים המיוחדים, לפי שבזה הדרך תהיינה ההקדמות הלקוחות לאמת העניינים ההם ראשונות, ינשאו נשואם על נושא מדרך מהו ולא יקרה בזה הכפל. וזה המין מן הקריטה הוא כמו אמצעי בין מה שהוא מחוייב משני הצדדים ומה שהוא על הצד היותר טוב משני הצדדים, ואם היה היותר מחוייב משני הצדדים יותר ראוי.

(K. 12, 13)

Zweitens: Allgemeine Begriffe gehen speziellen voraus, weil die auf diese Art zur Aufhellung jener Inhalte gewonnenen Prämissen *zuerst* stehen müssen, um auf eine bestimmte Art ihr Prädikat dem Subjekte zu vindizieren, ohne dass hierbei eine Vordoppelung entsteht (Syllogismus). Eine solche Art des Vordoppelens ist etwa das Mittlere zwischen dem, was sich aus zwei Seiten ergibt und demjenigen, was auf einer Seite steht (sc. einer Relation zugeordnet ist), die weit besser ist als die *beiden* Seiten; wenn aber das Bessere aus den zwei Relationen sich ergibt, so ist es um so günstiger.

This translation makes the entire paragraph unintelligible. To render the meaning of Gersonides clear, it is necessary to explain that הקדמה ראשונה means here a *primary proposition* or *premise*,

i. e. a proposition or premise which is not itself derived from a previous one in a given science. Thus the proposition, 'a triangle is a three-sided plane figure', might be called a *הקדמה ראשונה*; whereas the proposition, 'a scalene triangle is a three-sided plane figure', is not a *הקדמה ראשונה* because the proposition in question applies primarily to triangle in general. It applies to a specific kind of triangle by virtue of the latter being included in triangle in general. In the former proposition the predicate (*נישוא*) as applied to the subject (*נישא*) answers the question, 'What is it?' (*מהו* = *τί ἐστί*; = *quid est?*), i. e. it denotes the essence (*מהות*) of the subject.

Now the point of Gersonides's remark is that if we are studying or teaching geometry we should treat of triangle in general first, and of right triangle and isosceles triangle and scalene triangle afterwards, for the reason that in proving the properties of triangle in general (*העניינים ההם*) we shall make use of primary and essential propositions (*הקדמות ראשונות נישאו נישואם*) (*הקדמות ראשונות על נישא (נישואיהם) מדרך מהו*), and hence it will not be necessary to prove the same properties over again (*לא יקרה בזה*) when we come to treat of specific kinds of triangles (*עניינים*) (*המיוחדים*); for we have proved those properties of triangle *qua* triangle, which includes all kinds. But if we treat of scalene triangle first and prove among other things, say, that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles, we shall have to make use of the second proposition above mentioned, which is not primary and essential since it is not the proper answer to the question, 'What is a scalene triangle?' in the technical sense of 'what is?' and, moreover, since scalene triangle does not embrace all triangle, we shall have to prove the same property for triangle in general, and for isosceles triangle, and so on.

Then Gersonides harks back to his classification of order of precedence, of which we spoke before,¹¹ and says that the precedence just spoken of stands midway between *the essential in both respects* (*מה שהוא מחוייב משני הצדדים*), i. e. for subject matter and reader (*מצד הענין והמעיין*), and *the merely preferable in both*

¹¹ See No. 9.

respects (מה שהוא על צד היותר טוב משני הצדדים), although it rather belongs to the former than to the latter.

II. (L. 8, 6)

והשלישית כי המחבר הוא מבואר שלא יחבר לעצמו אבל להשפיע לזולתו. ולזה ראוי לו שישים השתלכותו לסדר דבריו בדרך יגיע בה המעיין אל תכלית הכוונה בספר ההוא, ומפני זה יחויב לו שיתחיל הלמוד בקל, ואם לא היה הקודם מודיע המתאחר בעצם. וזה המין מן הקרימה הוא מצד הענין בעצמו על צד היותר טוב, ומצד המעיין אשר לו היתה הכוונה בחבור הספר ההוא הוא כמו מחויב . . .

(K. 12, 24)

Drittens: Es ist erwiesen, dass der Verfasser nicht für sich schreibt, sondern um auf andere seine Kenntnisse ausströmen zu lassen. Deshalb muss er bestrebt sein, seine Worte nach einer Methode zu ordnen, durch welche der Leser den in unserem Buche beabsichtigten Zweck erreicht, und aus diesem Grunde muss die Belehrung mit dem Leichten beginnen, *es müsste denn das Vorhergehende das Folgende substantiell involvieren* (sc. dann wäre bei der Identität des Vorhergehenden mit dem Nachfolgenden die Methode vom Leichterem zum Schwereren überflüssig).¹² Diese Art des Vorsetzens ist *auch* inbezug auf den Inhalt selbst *die beste*,¹² während es inbezug auf den Leser, dem ja die Abfassung dieses Buches gilt, gleichsam notwendig ist . . .

The italicized passages in the translation are incorrect and conceal the thought of Gersonides instead of revealing it. What he says is that since the writer does not write for himself but for the reader, he should proceed from the easier to the more difficult, *even though, in following this order, the things treated first do not prove those which follow in a strictly essential, i.e. thoroughly scientific, form.*

In other words he means, it is sometimes necessary for the sake of clearness to pass from the particular to general, even though the particular cannot prove the general. It may, however,

¹² Italics mine.

illustrate it and make its meaning clear, and then one can proceed in a strictly scientific manner. Then he adds, this class of precedence belongs to the kind which so far as the subject matter is concerned is *merely preferable* (על צד היותר טוב), whereas for the reader it is practically *essential* (מחויב).

12. (L. 8, 32)

המשולש למרובע.

(K. 14, 6)

‘Oder das *Dreifache* dem *Vierfachen*.’

The Hebrew words denote *triangle* and *square* respectively.

13. (L. 8, fin.)

זה המין מן הקרימה הוא מצד הענין והמעין על צד היותר טוב,

(K. 14, 11)

Und diese Art der Vorsetzung ist sowohl mit Bezug auf den Gegenstand als auch mit Bezug auf den Leser *besonders vorteilhaft*.¹³

The italicized expression gives a wrong idea of G.'s meaning, and loses sight of the fact that על צד היותר טוב is a technical term (see No. 9). The correct translation is as follows: ‘This kind of precedence belongs to the class of the “preferable” (i. e. not to the “necessary” or “essential”).’ See also No. 10, last paragraph.

14. (L. 9, 29)

וגם במוזנות ההם יצטרך לו סדור מה בזה, רוצה לומר שיעדר ראשונה המזון אשר ירגיש מעט בהעדרו . . .

(K. 15, 30)

Und auch in Bezug auf die Nahrung muss der Autor eine bestimmte Ordnung innehalten, ich meine, *die Nahrung muss ihm so entzogen werden, dass er nicht viel davon merkt*.¹⁴

The italicized passage is not precise. G. says in the preceding context that in undermining an opponent's position one must do

¹³ Italics mine.

¹⁴ Italics mine.

it negatively by withdrawing tacitly the support of that position or, as G. expresses it, by withholding the food that serves as nourishment to his opponent's idea. Now he adds, this withdrawal of the support must also be done in a certain order. He must first withdraw *that food which the opponent will miss least*, and so gradually by removing one kind of food after another he will leave the opposite position without any support.

15. (L. 9, 32)

ואם יקרה שבהעדר מזון מה מן השרש הוא ישיבהו המחבר מזון
למה שיקיימהו או ירצה לקיימהו יהיה אז יותר . . .

(K. 15, fin.)

Wenn es nun dem Verfasser gelingt, *ihm*¹⁵ bei der Entziehung der Nahrung für jenes Prinzip gleichzeitig *solche zu reichen*, die dem entspricht, was der Autor bestätigt oder bestätigen will . . . dann ist es um so besser.

Here also the italicized words do not render ישיבהו correctly. ישיבהו does not mean *to give food to the opponent*, but *to turn the food withheld from the opponent into sustenance for one's own position*.

16. (L. 10, 1)

זה המין מן הקרימה הוא מצד המעיין על צד היותר טוב, וכמעט
שהוא מחוייב לפי מה שהקרמנו זכרו.

(K. 16, 7)

Diese Art der Antizipation ist für den Leser *besonders wertvoll*, und es ist *kaum nötig*,¹⁶ sie nach dem Vorausgeschickten noch besonders zu erwähnen.

In rendering על צד היותר טוב by the words 'besonders wertvoll', K. makes the same mistake as in No. 13, to which the reader is referred. In the latter part of the translation it is difficult to see how he manages to translate מחוייב שהוא 'es ist kaum nötig, sie nach dem Voraus-

¹⁵ Italics mine.

¹⁶ Italics mine.

geschickten noch besonders zu erwähnen'. The meaning of course is that this kind of precedence is more than *merely preferable* (על צד היותר טוב), as he has just said. It is *almost necessary* (כמעט שהוא מחוייב), according to our former classification (לפי מה שהקדמנו וזכרו).

17. (L. 10, 26)

וראוי שלא יעלם מן המעיין בדברינו שזה הספר לא נפלו בו הדברים
מוזלת עיין, אבל נפל בו מה שנפל אחר החקירה השלימה.

(K. 17, 15)

Es darf auch dem Leser unseres Buches nicht verborgen bleiben, dass in unserem Buch *nur spekulative Dinge enthalten sind*,¹⁷ welche aber erst nach einer solchen abschliessenden Untersuchung zum Ausdruck gelangen, die . . .

The italicized words are clearly a blunder, due to the assumption that עיין is always a technical term meaning theoretical speculation as a discipline. G. simply says here that the ideas laid down in this book were not put there without having been carefully thought out (מוזלת עיין). The sentiment corresponds to the words of Maimonides in the introduction of the *Moreh* (ed. Warsaw, p. 9 a): המאמר הזה לא נפלו בו הדברים כאשר נודמן, אלא בדקדוק גדול ובשקידה רבה.

18. (L. 12, ch. 1, beg.)

בעבור שהיה השכל היותר ראוי מחלקי הנפש שיחשב בו ההשארות והנצחות, לפי ששאר חלקי הנפש . . .

(K. 19, beg.)

Da der Intellekt insofern der vorzüglichste Teil der Seele ist, als man ihn für unsterblich und ewig hält, während die anderen Teile der Seele . . .

The first part of the sentence is incorrect. 'Vorzüglichste' is not the meaning of היותר ראוי in this case, and this makes the entire translation erroneous. G. does not say that the intellect is the most excellent of the parts of the soul because it is regarded

¹⁷ Italics mine.

as immortal, whereas the other parts are not. He says that of all the parts of the soul the most fitting to be thought immortal (היותר ראוי שיחשב בו ההשארות) is the intellect, for the other parts are obviously mortal.

19. (L. 13, 2)

The word הכנה in the characterizations of the material intellect Kellermann renders (p. 19 *fin.* and *passim*) 'Entelechie'. He tells us (p. 305) that Steinschneider is his authority for this rendering, though he admits that 'Anlage' would be more correct. It is indeed very unfortunate that K. has adopted this term, which signifies the very opposite of the Hebrew word הכנה. Entelechy (*ἐντελέχεια*) in Aristotle is practically synonymous with *ἐνέργεια* = activity, actuality, perfection. The difference between them need not for the present concern us. *δύναμις* (= power, potentiality) is opposed to both, and is related to matter (*ὕλη*) as *ἐνέργεια* and *ἐντελέχεια* are related to form (*μορφή, εἶδος*). To be sure, there is a twofold *ἐντελέχεια*, a first and a second. And the first entelechy is related to the second somewhat as *δύναμις* is to *ἐνέργεια*. Thus the soul in a sleeping man is potentially what it is actually in the man awake. Hence Aristotle defines the soul as the *first entelechy* of a potentially living body, because the definition must include the sleeping as well as the waking person. But it is clear that *ἐντελέχεια* is always on the side of actuality and perfection as contrasted with potentiality and lack of realization.

Now when we speak of the 'material intellect' in man, we are not viewing it with reference to its relation to the body. From that point of view it is part of the soul, and as such an entelechy. We are here considering the *material intellect* (השכל ההיוולאני) in its relation to the *active intellect* (שכל הפועל), and from this point of view it is in the position of matter, it is potential, hence entelechy is a misnomer. Moreover, *ἐντελέχεια* is rendered in Hebrew by the word שלמות = perfection. הכנה means preparation, readiness, disposition, and corresponds to *δύναμις*, which is the opposite of *ἐντελέχεια*. (See Trendelenburg, *De Anima*, p. 295 ff.)

20. (L. 13, 11)

כל אדם מדבר.

K. (20, 13) translates, 'Jeder Mensch *spricht*'. here מדבר means 'rational'. It corresponds to the Greek λογικόν.

21. (L. 13, 26)

לפי שארסטוטלס קרא אותו שכל היולאני, וזה ממה שיורה, כי
ארסטוטלס יראה שזאת ההכנה אינה בשכל נבדל, אבל לה דבר ילך
ממנה מדרגה (מדרגת) ההיולי.

(K. 21, 3)

... weil ihn (sc. den menschlichen Intellekt) auch Aristoteles *hylischen* Intellekt nennt; dies beweist, dass nach des Aristoteles Meinung die Entelechie nicht im separaten Intellekt ist (sc. wohl aber im Träger), dass aber eine *hylische Stufe* von ihr ausgeht.¹⁸

The italicized words are incorrect. The phrase ילך ממנה ההיולי is an Arabism, which K. seems not to have understood. It means, 'stands to it in the relation of matter'. The overlined words in the Hebrew, אבל . . . ההיולי, signify 'There is something which stands to it (viz. the disposition (הכנה)), in the relation of matter'. The Arabic idiom referred to is نزل من شيء منزلة. Thus Averroes in his compendium of metaphysics (ed. Cairo, p. 4, l. 20) has والمقالة الثانية نذكر فيها الأمور التي تنزل من الجزؤ الأول من هذه الصناعة منزلة الأنواع. This is rendered by Moses Ibn Tibbon¹⁹ המאמר השני נזכר בו הענינים אשר ילכו מן החלק הראשון מן המלאכה הזאת דרך המינים. The meaning evidently is this: 'In the second book we shall treat of those things which stand in the relation of species to the (topics treated in the) first part of this discipline.'

22. (L. 14, 10)

הצורה אשר הוא בה מה שהוא.

(K. 21, 36)

Die Form irgend eines bestimmten Dinges.

¹⁸ Italics mine.¹⁹ MS. copy in my possession.

The correct translation is, 'The form by virtue of which he (sc. man, as is clear from the context) is what he is'. Further discussion of this point is not necessary for any one who is familiar with Aristotelian ideas and the philosophical phraseology of the mediaeval Jewish writers.

23. (L. 14, 13)

ואולם כאשר הונחה זאת הצורה נבדלת בלתי היה ולא נפסד כמו
שיראה תמסמטיוס, הנה יחויב מזה בטול חזק, בהיות האדם והפסדו
אין המלט ממנו בשום פנים.

(K. 22, 3)

Wenn jedoch — wie Themistius annimmt — die Form eine separate sein soll, ohne Entstehen und Vergehen, so ergibt sich hieraus insofern eine grosse Absurdität, *als der Mensch unbedingt vergehen muss*.²⁰

Here K.'s mistake is perhaps not to be blamed. He did his best to translate his text intelligibly. But the reader will notice that the italicized passage is not a *literal* translation of the original, overlined above. The literal translation would read, 'Since man and his dissolution can in no manner be gotten away from'. And this is not what the argument requires G. to say. He should have said, 'Since man's *generation and dissolution* can in no manner be gotten away from'. K., it will be seen, concealed the difficulty by a free translation which, while it does away with 'man' as something to be escaped, still desiderates 'generation'.

The truth is that the text requires a slight and obvious emendation. בהיות should read בהיות, and there should be no punctuation mark after חזק, but rather after והפסדו. The phrase אין המלט ממנו בשום פנים refers to בטול. We shall therefore rewrite the last part of the original as follows: הנה יחויב מזה. בטול חזק בהיות האדם והפסדו, אין המלט ממנו בשום פנים. And the translation is, 'There would follow from this a great absurdity regarding man's generation and dissolution, which (sc. the absurdity) cannot be escaped in any manner'.

²⁰ Italics mine.

24. (L. 15, 1)

... 'דבקות הצורה הנבדלת לחמר יובן על שני פנים, אם דבקות אינו בעצמו, כמו דבקות השכל הפועל לשכבת הזרע ולזרעים שאינו באופן שיהיה הוא להם צורה קרובה, ואם דבקות בעצמו, כמו דבקות השכלים הנפרדים לגרמים השמימיים שהם בעצמם צורה קרובה להם, וכמו דבקות זה השכל ההיולאני בנו לפי דעת תמסמיום שהוא צורה קרובה לנו.

(K. 23, 9)

... die Verbindung der separaten Form mit der Materie auf zwei Weisen verstanden werden kann. Entweder ist die Verbindung nicht substantiell — wie die Verbindung des aktiven Intellekts mit dem Samenerguss und den *Spermatozoen*,²¹ die ja nicht derartig ist, dass er *eine ihnen verwandte Form annimmt*,²¹ oder die Verbindung ist substantiell — wie die Verbindung der separaten Intellekte mit den Himmelskörpern, *denn jene besitzen in ihrer substantiellen Verbindung eine diesen verwandte Form*²¹ — entsprechend der nach Ansicht des Themistius sich vollziehenden Verbindung zwischen uns und dem hylischen Intellekt, der ja *eine uns verwandte Form annimmt*.²¹

The italicized passages are in every case incorrect. לזרעים means simply plant seeds, not 'Spermatozoen'. צורה קרובה means 'proximate form', not '*verwandte Form*'. A proximate form is one which is the immediate cause of the genesis of a given object, or rather it is the form which is immediately united with a given matter to constitute a given object. This is illustrated by G.'s own examples. The 'separate Intelligences' are the immediate forms of the heavenly bodies or spheres, which are their bodies and which they move, as the human soul is the form of the human body and moves it. The material intellect similarly, according to Themistius, is the immediate intellectual form of man. Such union G. calls *essential* (רבקות בעצמו) = καθ' αὐτό. Proximate form may be contrasted with '*remote form*' (צורה רחוקה). This would be one which is the cause, directly or indirectly, of a proximate form, but is not identical with it. Thus, to use again

²¹ Italics mine.

G.'s own illustration, the Active Intellect is a form which causes or produces the form of semen or seed, but is not identical with it. Such relation G. calls *non-essential* union ($\overline{\text{דבקות אינו בעצמו}}$).

I will not take the time to do more than indicate the lack of precision in K.'s rendering of the last clause beginning וכמו דבקות ונכמו דבקות, זה השכל ההיולאני בנו essential union.

23. (L. 15, 10)

אבל נרצה, כשנקרא זאת²² הצורה נבדלת, שלא תהיה פעולתה בכלי נופיי כמו הענין בצורות ההיולאניות . . .

(K. 23, 27)

Wir aber meinen : Wenn wir *die*²³ Form eine separate nennen, so darf sich ihre Tätigkeit nicht mittels körperlicher Organe entfalten, wie dies bei den hylischen Formen der Fall ist.

The manner of introduction in this sentence — 'Wir aber meinen' — and particularly the rendering of זאת by 'die' destroys, it seems to me, the meaning of G.'s statement, and especially its connexion with the argument. G. does not say, as would appear from K.'s translation, that *his own opinion* is that when we call a form 'separate', we mean that its activity is not developed by means of corporeal organs. He is not giving his own opinion at all, and is not referring to the meaning of form in general. He is interpreting the sense in which the word 'separate' is used by Themistius when he speaks of the material intellect as a 'separate form', pointing out that it is not used in the same sense as when we speak of the active intellect as a separate form. The connexion of this statement with the argument is as follows :

G., in accordance with his method, has been defending tentatively the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias concerning the nature of the material intellect in man, and *ipso facto* opposing the opinion of Themistius. His argument was—to give only the substance of it briefly—that if we adopt Themistius's view that the material intellect is a 'separate form not subject to generation

²² Overlining mine.

²³ Italics mine.

and destruction', the absurd conclusion would follow that all matters subject to generation and destruction are endowed with human intellect. He then considers for a moment a possible defence of Themistius on the ground that the absurdity just mentioned would not necessarily follow from Themistius's view, any more than from the unanimous view that the *Active Intellect* is a separate form, not subject to generation and decay. His answer to this attempted defence of Themistius is that there is no similarity between the *non-essential* relation of the Active Intellect with the human seed and the *essential* union of the material intellect with man, required by Themistius. And if you object that in this case Themistius has no right to call the material intellect 'separate', I answer, says G., that he has, for in calling *this* form (זאת הצורה), i.e. the material intellect, separate, he means simply that it does not carry on its activity by means of corporeal organs, as the material forms do.

I do not know whether K. meant to indicate all this in his translation, and 'die' is merely a slip or misprint for 'diese', but I can judge only from what is before me, and that seems to me to conceal the drift of the argument rather than to bring it into evidence.

26. (L. 15, 24)

ועוד שכבר יראה כי מהמיוחדות שבסגולות הצורות ההיולאניות, במה שהם היולאניות, נמצאות בואת הצורה ר"ל השכל ההיולאני. וזה שכבר יראה בצורות ההיולאניות, במה שהם היולאניות, שחדושם במה שימצאו בו נמשך לשנוי בעצמות, ושהם מתרבות ברבוי הנושאים. והנה יראה כן בואת הצורה שחדושה נמשך לשנוי החמר אשר תמצא בו, כי הוא יוכן תחלה לקבל כח ההזנה והחוש קודם שתראה בו זאת הצורה, והיא גם כן מתרבה ברבוי הנושאים עד שצורת ראובן, דרך משל, היא זולת צורת שמעון במספר.

(K. 24, 16)

Ferner zeigt sich doch, dass *dann ganz bestimmte, spezifische hylische Formen, soweit sie überhaupt hylischen Charakter haben, in dieser Form, d.h. im hylischen Intellekt, enthalten sind.*²⁴ Zeigt

²⁴ Italics mine.

sich doch bei den hylischen Formen, soweit sie überhaupt hylisch sind, dass ihre Entstehung am Orte ihrer Existenz *mit der Veränderung (sc. des Ortes) substantiell zusammenhängt, so dass auch sie*²⁵ kraft der Pluralität der Träger zur Vielheit werden. *So ergibt sich also* bei dieser Form, dass ihre Entstehung mit der *Veränderlichkeit*²⁵ der Materie zusammenhängt, in der sie existiert, denn sie (sc. die Materie) ist *vorerst nur so lange vorbereitet, die Possibilität der Ernährung und der Sinnlichkeit anzunehmen, als in ihr die Form noch nicht zur Erscheinung kommt.*²⁵ *Sie aber* (sc. die Form) *vermehrt sich gleichfalls*²⁵ mit der Vervielfältigung der Träger, *bis*²⁵ beispielsweise die Form des Ruben numerisch eine andere als die des Simon ist.

Here also K.'s translation, especially in the passages italicized, is either absolutely incorrect or misleading. In either case it tends to make G.'s argument unintelligible or obscure. Without troubling to enter into the causes or effects of K.'s errors, I shall try to correct them. The meaning of the first sentence of the original quoted above is as follows :

'Besides, it appears that some of the peculiar properties pertaining to material forms *qua* material are found in this form, viz. the material intellect.'

G. is trying to prove that Themistius's view of the material intellect as a *separate* form is incorrect, by showing that the material intellect has properties in common with material forms, and hence is itself a material form, and not separate. In the sequel he proceeds to show that this is the case. And he instances two properties peculiar to material forms as such (צורות היולאניות שהם היולאניות במה), which are also found in the material intellect. They are (1) that a change in the bearer of the material form is a necessary pre-requisite before the material form in question appears ; and (2) that the form multiplies with the multiplication of the subject. Accordingly we translate the following sentences as follows :

'For it is a property of material forms as such (1) that their first appearance in the bearer in which they exist follows essentially

²⁵ Italics mine.

upon (i.e. cannot take place without) a change, (2) that they multiply with the multiplication of the subject.'

He then proceeds to show that these two properties are found in the material intellect, and we translate the rest as follows :

'And it appears in reference to this form also that its first appearance follows upon (i.e. cannot take place without) a change in the matter in which it exists. For before this form (i.e. the material intellect) can appear in it (sc. the matter), the latter must first be prepared to receive the powers of nutrition and of sensation. [This proves the first property.] But it also multiplies with the multiplication of the subjects. Thus, the form of Reuben, for example, is numerically distinct from the form of Simeon . . .'

27. (L. 16, 2)

אלא אם יהיו מתחלפים במין.

K. (25, 7) translates מין by 'Genus'. This is, strictly speaking, incorrect. מין and סוג are technical terms in logic. מין = εἶδος = species ; סוג = γένος = genus, and it is best to render them precisely in every case.

28. (L. 16, 11)

ומהם, שכבר יראה בכחות המשיגות ההיולאניות שלא ישיגו רבוי הבלתי בעל תכלית, לפי שהם יקבלו מה שיקבלוהו קבול פרטי מצד קבלם אותו קבול היולאני והמשל, שהכח הרואה כבר ישיג זה הצבע אשר בזה הנראה אשר הוא בזה השטח ובוה התמונה אשר לזה הנראה, לפי שהוא מקבל אותו קבול היולאני באופן מה, ר"ל שכבר נרשמה בראותו זאת ההשגה רושם מה, והיה מחויב מפני זה שיהיה הנראה לו בשטח מקבל (מוגבל x) ובתמונה מוגבלת ולא ישיג הצבע במוחלט, אבל ישיג זה הצבע, ואולם זאת ההכנה נמצאת שופטת משפט בלתי תכליתי, כי היא תשיג הגורות הכוללות והגדרים אשר כל אחד מהם הוא משפט על רבוי בלתי בעל תכלית.

(K. 25, 22)

Zweitens. Es ergibt sich doch bei den wahrnehmenden hylischen Kräften, dass sie eine unendliche Vielheit nicht perzipieren können, weil sie doch in ihrer Perzeption insofern *singular* verfahren als sie nur eine *hylische* Aufnahme haben.

Zum Beispiel: Die Sehfähigkeit perzipiert *diese* Farbe an *diesem* Sichtbaren auf *dieser* Fläche an *dieser* Gestalt *dieses* Sichtbaren weil sie es in bestimmter Art nur *hylisch* perzipiert, ich meine nämlich, dass doch in seinem (sc. des hyl. Intell.) Sehen die Perzeption irgendwie determiniert ist, weshalb das ihm Sichtbare auf einer bestimmten Fläche und an einer bestimmten Gestalt sein muss, sodass er nicht die absolute Farbe, sondern nur *diese* Farbe wahrnimmt. Die Entelechie jedoch fällt nur *unendliche* Urteile, denn sie nimmt die allgemeinen Urteile und jene Definitionen wahr, deren jede einzelne ein *unendliches* Urteil ist.

The sentence beginning 'ich meine nämlich' is incorrect and brings confusion into the entire discussion. G. is so far speaking of the so-called 'material powers of perception' (כחות המשיגות (ההיולאניות), which he distinguishes from the material intellect, in order to prove the latter 'separate'. The distinction is that the material powers of perception, like the power of sight, for example, cannot perceive the infinite because their perception has for its object the particular, hence it sees one thing at a time; whereas the material intellect (he calls it here ההכנה) deals with the universal, which embraces an infinite number of individuals. It is clear, therefore, that all which precedes the sentence beginning זאת ההכנה ואולם refers to the material power of sight (כח הראייה), and not the material intellect. The first correction to be made, therefore, in K.'s translation of the sentence in question is to change 'seinem' into 'ihrem', 'sc. des hyl. Intell.' into 'sc. der Sehkraft', 'ihm' into 'ihr', and 'er' into 'sie'. But there is another error in K.'s rendering of the words שכבר נרשמה בראותו זאת ההשגה רשם מה. The words corresponding to them in his translation are, 'dass doch in seinem . . . Sehen die Perzeption irgendwie determiniert ist'. This is not the meaning of the words in question. רשם signifies to make an impression, a mark; and the expression in question is intended to explain the preceding statement, that the power of sight receives its object in a material manner (לפי שהוא מקבל אותו קבול היולאני). What I mean is, G. says, that when the power of sight sees, this perception (זאת ההשגה) is actually *impressed* upon the sense faculty

(נרשמה רושם מה); i. e. a material impress is made upon the sensorium. This is made quite clear by a similar statement of G. on p. 23, l. 30. וזה כי זה אמנם היה בשאר הכחות המשיגות החילאניות מפני שהם ישיגו מה ששיגו באמצעות הכלי הגופי הנושא להם, וזה הנושא יתפעל הפעלות מה בהרשם בו דמיון הדבר המושג.

Here G. tells us plainly that the material powers of perception other than the material intellect perceive their objects by means of a corporeal organ in which these powers reside; and that this corporeal organ is affected in a certain way because an *impression is made upon it, which resembles the object of perception* (the copy theory of perception).

29. (L. 17, 1) = (K. 26, 29)

מין is translated 'Genus'. See No. 27.

30. (L. 18, 6)

מהם, שכבר יחויב לתמסמסוים שתהיה בכאן הכנה בעצם נבדל, ר"ל ההכנה לקבל המושכלות. וזה מבואר הבטול, לפי שהכנה הוא נמשך להיולי . . .

(K. 28, 29)

Erstens. Es ergab sich doch für Themistius dass es *bei den Sublunarien eine substantiell separate Entelechie gibt*,²⁶ ich meine nämlich die *Entelechie*²⁶ für die Aufnahme der Intelligibilia. Dies ist aber erwiesenermassen absurd, weil die Potentialität mit dem Hylischen zusammenhängt und in ihm allein existiert.

There are several errors here. בכאן in G. does sometimes refer to sublunar things specifically, but not here. In the present instance 'sublunarity' is irrelevant, and בכאן simply denotes existence, like the English expletive 'there' in the phrase 'there is', and the Arabic *هنا* = Hebrew *הנה*.

Then again the expression הכנה בעצם נבדל is not rendered correctly by K. What G. says is that according to Themistius it would follow that a potentiality or a possibility (הכנה) may reside in a separate substance (נבדל), i. e. the

²⁶ Italics mine.

possibility of receiving *intelligibilia* may reside in the material intellect which, according to Themistius, is a separate substance. This, he proves, is impossible, for a power or potentiality (כח) necessarily presupposes a *material* substratum (להיולי בהכרח); whereas the material intellect according to Themistius is a separate substance, hence a 'formal' and not a 'material' substratum. We see here at the same time how unfortunate it is that K. renders הכנה by 'Entelechie'. It means the very opposite—potentiality = *dύναμις*. G. himself identifies it here with כח. See No. 19.

31. (L. 18, 13)

ואולם לבן רשד לא יהויב זה הבטול, לפי שהוא יניח שזה אמנם
קרה לזאת הצורה, ר"ל שתהיה [הכנה],²⁷ מצד דבקותה בנו, לא שיתכן
בן מה בן.

(K. 29, 7)

Jedoch nach Averroes ergibt sich keine derartige Absurdität, weil er annimmt, *dass dies* ²⁸ (sc. die Aufnahme der Intelligibilia) *dieser Form wirklich zukomme, dass sie nämlich insofern eine Entelechie sei, als sie mit uns verbunden ist*,²⁸ nicht aber, dass sie es an und für sich sei.

K.'s translation in the italicized passages somewhat obscures G.'s meaning. The argument is a continuation of that discussed in the last number (30). The point is that Themistius's view of the nature of the material intellect cannot be true, for it leads to the impossible situation of a potentiality residing in a separate substance. A separate substance must be pure actuality, and whatever is potential must have a material substratum. But then the question arises, Does not this difficulty affect Averroes's view just as much as that of Themistius? For Averroes identifies the material intellect in man with the universal Active Intellect, which is according to all accounts a separate substance. G.'s answer is, No, Averroes is not affected by this difficulty. For his idea is that the potential character attaches to the Intellect *per*

²⁷ See Kellermann, p. 29, note 1.

²⁸ Italics mine.

accidens, in so far as it is temporarily associated with the individual man, but not *per se*. *Per accidens* a potentiality may reside in a form, as G. said before, l. 9, וכשתמצא אותו בצורות הוא, במקרה מצד הנושא. K.'s rendering, therefore, 'dass dies . . . dieser Form *wirklich zukomme*', makes G. say the very opposite of what he intends to say, and is contradicted by the sequel. The correct translation of the words לפי שהוא יניח שזה אמנם קרה לזאת הצורה, בעצמה כן ר"ל שתהיה הכנה, מצד דבקוה בנן, לא שתהיה²⁹ is as follows:

'[The difficulty does not affect Averroes] because his theory is that this circumstance (שזה), namely that the Intellect has a potentiality (ר"ל שתהיה הכנה), attaches to this form (the Intellect) *per accidens* (קרה), in so far as it is associated with us, and not in so far as its own substance is concerned.' The words ר"ל שתהיה הכנה are explanatory of שזה, and hence K.'s parenthesis is unnecessary and misleading.

32. (L. 18, 19) = (K. 29, 18)

ספר השמים והעולם is not *περὶ κόσμων* but *περὶ οὐρανῶν*. Cf. Steinschneider, 'Die Hebräischen Uebersetzungen', p. 125, § 55^{29a}.

33. (L. 19, ch. 3 beg.)

ואחר שזכרנו הטענות אשר זכרום הקודמים או היו בכה דבריהם באופן מה שאפשר בהם שיהיו מקיימות דעת דעת מאלו הדעות, והם בעצמם מבטלות דעת דעת כמו שזכרנו, הנה היה סדר העיון נותן שנעניין בטענות האלו ונברור מהם מה שיקיים או שיבטל קיום אמתי או בטול אמתי ממה שלא יקיים או יבטל קיום אמתי או בטול אמתי. אלא שאין דרך לנו לאמת באחת מהטענות האלו שיקויים בה דעת מה מאלו הדעות קיום אמתי, וזה שאם היה זה אפשר, הנה יהיה זה אם מצד שהטענה ההיא מקיימת הדעת ההוא, אם מצד שהיא מבטלת הדעת שהוא מקבילו. ואולם שנבאר זה מצד שהיא מבטלת בטול אמתי הדעת שהוא מקבילו היא בלתי אפשרי. וזה שהוא מבואר במה שיבטל בו דעת מה בטול מה שלא יקויים בו הדעת אשר הוא מקבילו קיום אמתי אלא אם היו שתי

²⁹ See Kellermann, p. 29, note 2.

^{29a} When this was written I overlooked K.'s own correction of *κόσμων* to *οὐρανῶν* in his list of *errata* at the end of the book, p. 303, l. 22.

הדעות כל חלקי הסותר אשר אפשר שיפלו בזאת החקירה. אבל בזולת זה הוא מבואר שכאשר יבוטל אחד מהם לא יקיים אחד מהדעות הנשארות, כל שכן שלא יקיים בו דעת מיוחד מהם.

(K. 30, ch. 3 beg.)

Nachdem wir nun die Argumente, welche die Alten anführen, oder welche doch in ihren Worten beschlossen liegen, derartig zu Worte kommen liessen, dass sie einzelne dieser Ansichten bestätigen, während sie gleichzeitig einzelne dieser Ansichten ablehnen, wie wir dies erwähnten, so würde es nun der Gang der Spekulation mit sich bringen, dass wir diese Argumente untersuchen, und aus ihnen jene auswählen, die eine wirkliche Bestätigung oder wirkliche Ablehnung bilden, im Gegensatze zu jenen, die keine wirkliche Bestätigung bzw. Ablehnung bilden. Indessen mangelt es uns an der Methode, um durch eines der Argumente, welches irgend eine der Ansichten bestätigt, eine wirkliche Bestätigung zu erreichen. Wenn dies nämlich möglich wäre, so könnte dies nur so geschehen, dass entweder jenes Argument die eine Ansicht bestätigt, oder die ihr entgegenstehende ablehnt. Jedoch müssen wir darauf hinweisen, *dass eine völlige Ablehnung der ihr entgegengesetzten Ansicht nicht möglich ist*. Es ist nämlich erwiesen, dass durch die völlige Ablehnung einer Ansicht die Bestätigung der ihr entgegengesetzten nur dann möglich ist, *wenn die beiden Ansichten in all ihren möglichen einander kontradizierenden Teilen in den Bereich unserer Untersuchung fallen*; ³⁰ im anderen Falle ist erwiesen, dass durch die Beseitigung der einen Ansicht die übrigen nicht bestätigt sind, noch weniger, dass eine *bestimmte* Ansicht von ihnen bestätigt wäre.

The reader will see that by K.'s mistranslation of the passages which I italicized, he destroyed G.'s argument and made him talk incoherently. We cannot fully refute, he makes G. say, an opposed opinion, because by such complete refutation we cannot prove our own unless both opinions in all their possible contradictory parts fall within the domain of our investigation !

³⁰ Italics mine.

Granting that the reason given ('because, &c.') makes sense, which it does not, what has it to do with the first part of the sentence? The fact that the refutation of an opinion opposed to a given one cannot prove the latter except under certain conditions, does not show that the refutation itself is impossible. And then what *are* the conditions? You cannot prove an opinion, G. is made to say, by refuting its opposite unless both opinions fall within the domain of our investigation! Whoever heard of two contradictory opinions *not* belonging to the same investigation! If one says *a* is *b* and the other says *a* is not *b*, how can these two help 'falling within the domain of a given investigation' in which they arise? Either both opinions fall within our investigation or neither. And in either case what has this to do with the proof of an opinion by the refutation of its opposite? Absolutely nothing. If the two contradictory opinions do not fall within our investigation, we are not concerned with them. But they belong somewhere, to some investigation, and there the refutation of a given opinion does or does not prove its opposite. To concoct such a paragraph is bad enough, but to lay such incoherence at the door of Gersonides, the keenest of logicians, is nothing short of unpardonable. At least K. might have added a note saying that though the passage made no sense, he could not translate it in any other way and suspects a corruption in the text.

Will the reader after all this be surprised when he is told that G.'s statement is perfectly plain and straightforward and makes excellent sense? What G. says is this. We have had, so far, arguments *pro* and *con* on both sides of the question. Our problem now is to find out which of these arguments are valid, really proving or really disproving the thesis with which they deal. Now if a given argument is to prove a given thesis, it must do so in one of two ways, directly, by proving the thesis it defends, or indirectly, by refuting its opposite. The indirect method will lead to conclusive proof only in case the two theses in their opposition exhaust the possibilities in the case. Otherwise by refuting one possibility you have not yet proved the second, for there may be a third.

Now we shall translate the two passages in G. which caused the trouble.

ואולם שנבאר זה מצד שהיא מבטלת בטול אמתי הדעת שהוא מקבילו
הוא בלתי אפשרי. וזה שהוא מבואר במה שיבוטל בו דעת מה בטול
מה שלא יקויים בו הדעת אשר הוא מקבילו קיום אמתי אלא אם היו שתי
הדעות כל חלקי הסותר אשר אפשר שיפלו בואת החקירה.

'To prove a given thesis by an argument that fully refutes the opposing thesis is impossible. For it is clear that by refuting a given thesis in a certain way the opposing thesis is not completely proved unless the two theses constitute all the contradictory alternatives possible in a given investigation.'

34. (L. 20, 11)

כמו הענין בחוש הטעם כשהיה בעל טעם. שאם היה שיהיה משיג
המוטעמים, הנה הוא משיג אותם על זולת מה שהם עליו מהטעם.

(K. 32. 8)

... wie dies bei dem Geschmackssinne der Fall ist, wenn er einen Geschmack empfindet; denn wenn er dann die schmeckbaren Dinge aufnimmt, nimmt er sie anders auf, als sie in Wirklichkeit *für ihn*³¹ sind.

The words 'für ihn' evidently are intended to represent עליו in the phrase על זולת מה שהם עליו. But this is incorrect. עליו does not refer to the sense of taste and cannot mean 'for it'. Besides, such a translation does not suit the context. For when the organ of taste is affected with a given taste and then tastes other things, it does not perceive their tastes as they really are, but it does precisely perceive them as they are *for it*.

The truth of the matter is that the pronominal suffix in עליו refers to מה, and the phrase is an Arabism. Thus Averroes in his *Compendium of Metaphysics* (ed. Cairo, p. 5, l. 17) defines the various uses of the term *موجود* = *נמצא* = *δν* = *ens*. One of its uses is identical with the meaning of صادق.

وهو الذي في الذهن علي ما هو عليه خارج الذهن.

³¹ Italics mine.

The meaning is, that which is in the mind *just as it is* outside of the mind.

The Hebrew of Moses Ibn Tibbon³² reads **הוא אשר ימצא בשכל בפיו מה שהוא עליו חוץ מן השכל**.

The negative of the phrase is also found in the same treatise, **ونسبة بعضها الى بعض على غير ما هي عليه في انفسها**, p. 29, l. 9.

The Hebrew of this (MS.) reads **ויחס קצתם אל קצת על זולת מה שהם עליו בנפשותינו**.

The translation is, 'The relation between them is different from what it is in their (Hebr. our) minds'.

Accordingly the similar phrase in Gersonides is to be translated, 'It perceives their taste in a manner different from what it actually is'.

35. (L. 20, 28)

ועוד שאם היה מהכרח זה ההרגש שיהיה זה החוש מהפעל תחלה מן האיכות אשר ישיג, הנה יהיה זה בלתי אפשר לו שירגישהו, כי הוא אמנם ישיגהו מפני השווי אשר בו, כמו שהתבאר בספר הנפש.

(K. 33, 2)

Und ferner: Wenn es zur Notwendigkeit dieser Empfindung gehörte, dass der Sinn zuerst (*sc.* vor der Empfindung) von den Qualitäten affiziert wird, die er begreift (*sc.* dass also die *Sinnesqualität* mit der *Gegenstandsqualität* identisch ist), so kann er überhaupt nichts empfinden, denn er empfindet nur wegen seiner *Gleichheit*³³ mit ihm (*sc.* an sich, ohne Affiziertheit durch den ihm gleichen Gegenstand), wie dies im Buche der Seele (II, 5, 11) erwiesen ist.

The passage in *De Anima* to which Gersonides refers is no doubt the one in bk. ii, ch. 11, p. 424 a 1 ff.:

Τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν. ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν ὅλον αὐτὸ ἐνεργεία, τοιοῦτον ἐκείνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὅλον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν.

³² MS. copy in my possession.

³³ Italics mine.

From this we learn that Aristotle regards the sensorium as potentially containing the perception which the external stimulus as actually, and which it induces in the sensorium when perception becomes actual. But since the sensorium is equally able to perceive a quality and its opposite, it must be potentially both, actually neither. And that is why, says Aristotle, we do not perceive what is equally warm with the perceiving organ, or equally cold with it, or equally hard or soft. We can perceive only what exceeds in a given quality the degree of the perceiving organ. We may thus conceive of sensation, or rather of the sensorium, as a *something intermediate* between the sensible opposites.

We may also quote the concluding lines of ch. 5 of the same book, p. 418 a 3 ff., τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἔστιν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχεία, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ' ὁμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκείνο.

Summing up the previous discussion, he says, the sensorium is potentially what the perceptible object is actually. The sentient organ is affected by the object in so far as it is not like it, but after it has been affected it becomes like it.

We now understand what G. means in the passage under discussion. He is trying to show that the sense of touch is not affected by the heat or cold of the object before it perceives it, for if that were the case it would not then be able to perceive it. It is the *equality* in the sensorium (i.e. its indifference to the two opposites, or its equilibrium between them, or its intermediate character, the Aristotelian μεσότης) which enables it to perceive the sensible object. Hence if it were first affected with the quality of the object, it would not be able to perceive it.

It was necessary to go into this lengthy discussion in order to show that K.'s translation of וו"ש, 'Gleichheit mit ihm' ('denn er empfindet nur wegen seiner Gleichheit mit ihm') cannot be correct because Aristotle, to whom G. refers, says the very opposite (πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν). And moreover, it would not suit G.'s argument, for in that case it would really follow that the sensorium is affected first and perceives afterwards—the very opposite conclusion to the one G. desires to reach. To be sure,

K., aware of this difficulty, endeavours to avoid it by a qualification in parentheses, 'sc. an sich, ohne Affiziertheit durch den ihm gleichen Gegenstand'. But this is altogether unsatisfactory. For in the first place, העקר חסר מן הספר. The qualification is the essential part of the argument, and G. could not have left that to the reader's imagination. Secondly, what does 'Gleichheit mit ihm an sich' mean? Equality *per se* of the sensorium with the object? This is exactly what it is not. Potentially it is both like and unlike, since it is both cold and hot, actually it is decidedly unlike. It becomes actually like only when it has been affected, and then it can no longer perceive a quality of the same degree.

The right solution is clearly the one suggested above, namely that שווי represents the Aristotelian *μεσότης*, and means 'equilibrium', 'indifference', 'intermediate character', *equality* if you please, but in the sense of being equally situated with respect to the opposite qualities.

36. (L. 21, 4)

עד שהניע הטבע להכנה תקבל הדברים קבול בלתי מעורב עם ההיילי.
והנושא לזאת ההכנה כלל, והיא זאת ההכנה, ר"ל השכל ההיילאני, כמו
שהתבאר מענינו במה שאין ספק בו.

(K. 33, 24)

... bis sich die Natur zur Entelechie hin realisiert, deren Aufnahme sich ja hylenlos vollzieht. Der Träger dieser Entelechie ist ein *Generelles*,³⁴ nämlich die in Rede stehende Entelechie, d. i. der hyliche Intellekt, wie dies aus seinem Wesen zweifelsfrei erwiesen wurde.

The translation of K. is one that naturally suggests itself by the punctuation of L. But there are difficulties. First, if כלל is a predicate adjective qualifying והנושא and means universal, כולל or כללי would be the proper term. Secondly, G. does not hold that the material intellect is a universal any more than the *intelligibilia* (מושכלות) which it acquires (see p. 62, 23 ff., where he argues against the universality of the *intelligibilia*). Thirdly, the whole statement is here irrelevant. The entire paragraph

³⁴ Italics mine.

is devoted to showing the gradations in the material or immaterial character of the perceptions received by the different faculties of man. He begins with the crudest of the senses, namely, the sense of touch, whose reception of its specific *qualia* is more or less material, i.e. the sensorium is itself affected by the *quale* it perceives. He then proceeds to the sense of sight, which is not itself coloured by the colour it perceives, though it is nevertheless affected materially in some way, as is shown by the fact that it may be so dazzled by a bright light that it cannot thereafter see an ordinary light. The common sense is still less material in its reception of its *qualia*, the imagination still less so, until finally we get to a faculty or disposition (הכנה) which receives its *qualia* without any material mixture whatsoever. This faculty is the one we are discussing, namely, the material intellect.

I should therefore delete the period after ההיו' in L. and translate as follows:

'... Until nature arrives at a faculty which receives things in a manner altogether (בלל) unmixed with matter and with the bearer of this faculty (cp. p. 20, 18, בשיאמר בואת ההכנה שהיא, cp. p. 20, 18, מקבלת המושכלות קבול בלתי מעורב עם נושאה). This is this disposition, namely, the material intellect, as is clear from its nature without any doubt.'

37. (L. 21, 14)

והנה זכר אבן רשר הטענה בקצורו לספר הנפש בקצור, ואמר טוען
על תמסמטיוס והנמשכים אליו כי מה שזה דרכו מהצורות הנה אין דרכו
שישלם בה בהיותו נשם נפסר.

(K. 34, 9)

Averroes hat nun dieses Argument kurz in seinem Kompendium zum Buche der Seele erwähnt, indem er den Einwand erhebt: *Was den Charakter der Formen betrifft, so besteht dieser nicht darin, dass sich bei ihrem Entstehen ein vergänglicher Körper vollendet.*³⁵

³⁵ Italics mine.

The italicized lines in the German do not reproduce the meaning of the Hebrew, and, moreover, they attribute a statement to Averroes which no Aristotelian could possibly make. As I understand the meaning of the German, it says, in effect, that a perishable body is not realized or perfected by the genesis of a form. This statement is directly opposed to the very essence of the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form, and would nullify not merely Themistius's view of the material intellect, but also that of Alexander and Averroes himself. In fact the entire discussion would have its bottom knocked out. For according to Aristotle, as everybody knows, all forms in the sublunar world have just this function that through them perishable bodies are realized, actualized, perfected. To be sure, we cannot say that this realization is due to the *genesis* (Entstehen) of the form, for forms, according to Aristotle, have neither genesis nor dissolution any more than matter. But this is altogether irrelevant to the question at issue.

Averroes is represented as arguing against Themistius, who holds that the material intellect is a separate form not subject to genesis and destruction. And his argument is that a form *of this sort* (מה שזה דרכו מן הצורות) cannot be the means of perfecting a perishable body, not that no form can do so. The word בהויה is difficult. It cannot mean 'bei ihrem Entstehen'. For, in the first place, the reading would have to be בהיותה, and secondly, a form as such is not subject to הויה, as was said before. If the text is correct, the word belongs to גשם: a perishable body cannot in its genesis be perfected by such a form. We should expect indeed בהיותו. And hence I would suggest emending the text as follows: אין דרכו שישלם בה גשם הזה נפסד. A body subject to genesis and dissolution cannot be perfected by such a form.

38. (L. 22, 10)

לפי שהתעסקם בפעולתם ממה שימנע זה הכח מעשות פעולתו . . .

(K. 35, 26)

Denn ihre (sc. der *Entelechie*) Beschäftigung mit deren ³⁶ (sc.

³⁶ Italics mine.

der Kräfte) Funktion hindert diese Kraft (sc. die Entelechie) daran, ihre eigene Funktion auszuüben . . .

As the Hebrew text shows (שהתעסקם בפעולתם), and as is clear from the context, 'ihre' is plural and refers not to 'Entelechie' but to 'die Kräfte', and the translation should read 'ihre Beschäftigung mit ihren Funktionen', both 'ihre' and 'ihren' referring to 'die Kräfte'.

39. (L. 22, 13)

ואולם מה שאפשר שיקיים בו תמסמיוס בזאת ההכנה שהיא נבדלת מפני השגתה הרבוי הבלתי בעל תכלית, הוא מבואר גם כן שלא יבוטל בו דעת אלכסנדר בטול אמתיו. וזה שאמנם יחויב בכחות המשיגות ההיולאניות שיישיגו הפרטי מצד הטבע הנושא להם המקבל זאת ההשגה, כי הוא יקבלה בהכרח במשיגיו המוחש אשר היה בו פרטי, לפי שאין מדרך הגשם שיקבל צורה רקה מוקצת מקרים תהיה בהם פרטית.

(K. 35, 31)

Wenn jedoch des Themistius Ansicht von dem separaten Charakter der Entelechie dadurch bestätigt werden soll, dass sie eine unendliche Vielheit begreifen kann, so ist hiermit gleichfalls erwiesen, dass hierdurch Alexanders Ansicht keineswegs vollständig beseitigt wird. *Denn in Wahrheit müssen die perzipierenden hylischen Kräfte das Singuläre von seiten der Natur ihres Trägers begreifen, dem gerade dieses Begreifen eigentümlich ist*, denn er vollzieht diese Perzeption unbedingt durch die Attribute des sinnlich Wahrgenommenen, durch welches er (sc. *der Träger*)³⁷ ein Singuläres wird; es ist nämlich nicht die Weise des Körpers, dass er eine Form ohne eine jener Akzidenzien perzipiert, durch welche sie (sc. die Form) ein Singuläres wird.

The part of this translation which I italicized ('Denn . . . ist') suffers from the fact that the emphasis is not placed where it properly belongs. The point of the argument is that even though, according to Alexander, the material intellect is not a separate form but contained in some other part of the soul as its subject,

³⁷ Italics mine.

it does not necessarily follow that it must perceive the particular, like the senses, for example. For they, too, would perceive an infinite multiplicity like the intellect if it were not for their corporeal subject, the sense organ, which is the proper recipient of the perceptions. This point, it seems to me, K.'s translation does not bring out with sufficient clearness.

In the latter part, the words **אשר היה בו פרטי** refer not to the bearer (**הנושא**), as K. indicates ('durch welches er (sc. *der Träger*) ein Singuläres wird'), but to the sensible (**המחושה**). The meaning is, the bearer, namely, the sense organ, receives the sense percept together with the attributes of the sensible which make the latter particular. We are not concerned here with the particularity of the sense organ or sense faculty, but with that of its object, the sensible, and its content, the percept.

40. (L. 22, 22-33) = (K. 36, 11-32)

Without troubling to reproduce here the text and its translation, I shall limit myself to making the necessary corrections which are slight but indispensable for a right understanding. 'Bei ihrer Aufnahme der Form welche sie begreift' (20-21) should read 'Bei ihrer Aufnahme dieser Form wenn sie sie begreift', corresponding to the Hebrew **בקבול זאת הצורה** **בשישכילה** (27-8). Similarly 'begreifen' (26) should read 'aufnehmen', representing the Hebrew **מקבלים** (30).

The argument refers back to L. 16, 21-6 = K. 26, 2-11. The point there made in favour of Themistius was this, that the material intellect cannot be a mere potentiality (**הכנה נמורה**), for in that case it would not be able to apprehend itself, since its function is to apprehend forms, and a mere potentiality is not a form. But this conclusion is untenable, for we should not then be able to explain the material intellect's apprehension of 'privation' (**העדר** = *στέρησις*), such as that *a* is not *b*, or that *a* is not, which are not forms. As it is we explain this power by saying that it is the result of the material intellect apprehending itself as free of forms (**רק מן הצורות**). But if it apprehends itself, it must be a form.

This argument is taken up in the passage under discussion. And before answering it, G. offers a counter-argument against Themistius. If, he says, the material intellect is a form, then when it thinks of itself, it *receives* the form it thinks, and (since the form is itself) it *receives* itself. This is absurd. A thing cannot *receive* itself. It is already there. If you reply to me that if this be so then nothing can think itself, and yet all admit that the separate Intelligences do apprehend themselves, my answer is that *receiving* and *apprehending* are two different things. No one says that the separate Intelligences *receive* themselves (אנחנו לא נניח בהם שיהיו מקבלים עצמם). To 'receive' means to acquire a thing which formerly you did not possess. When the separate Intelligences apprehend themselves, they do not acquire anything new. But with the material intellect it is different. Its sole function is, according to all accounts, to *receive* forms which it had not before, which forms actualize and perfect it (השכל החילאני יקבל הצורות בהשכילן אותם) (וישלם בהם). Hence it follows that if its capacity is a form, it acquires that too when it thinks it. But this is absurd, for a thing cannot acquire or receive itself. The *direct* answer to the argument in favour of Themistius, above referred to, will be treated in the next number.

41. (L. 22, 33—23, 14) = (K. 36, 32—37, 35)

Here K.'s translation is correct, though one does not see the meaning of the parenthetical remarks, 'sc. wie bei den anderen hyllischen Formen' (37. 2), or 'sc. wie bei dem separaten Intellekt' (*ibid.*, 34).

In this passage G. answers the argument in favour of Themistius given in the beginning of the preceding number. The answer is this. It does not follow from the fact that the material intellect apprehends 'privation' (cf. preceding number) that it perceives itself *per se*, and hence is a form. For every other perceiving power apprehends 'privation' without perceiving itself. Take the sense of sight. It perceives not only colour, but also the absence of colour, yet it does not perceive itself. In fact the two

are inseparable, the positive and the negative, possession and privation (= קנין and העדר, ἔξις and στέρησις). Whatever faculty perceives the former must necessarily perceive also the latter, except that it perceives the positive primarily and *per se*, the negative secondarily and *per accidens*. Similarly the material intellect apprehends forms *per se*, and hence perceives the privation of form *per accidens*, and hence itself too *per accidens* as a privation, but not a form. This solution is not liable to the objection advanced against Themistius, viz. that the material intellect *receives* itself (cf. preceding number). For the material intellect, according to our view, does receive forms, but not their negations. The latter it perceives *per accidens*, and that is not the same as *receiving*. It perceives itself *per accidens*, but does not *receive* itself.

(*To be continued.*)